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Colson: Due Process and the Wartime Draft of Manpower
DUE PROCESS AND THE WARTIME
DRAFT OF MANPOWER

THE fact that we are engaged in another war -

a war in which
it is imperative that we use to the full all available manpower
not only on the military but on the production front as well - calls
for a critical reexamination of Ex parte Hudgins,' the case in which
our court held unconstitutional a war emergency statute passed
during the last world war.
In substance the statute provided that during the war and for
six months thereafter any able bodied male resident of the state,
students excepted, who shall fail or refuse to work at least thirtysix hours a week, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and it was
further provided that "In no case shall the claim by the accused
of inability to obtain work or employment be a defense to a prosecution hereunder, unless it shall be proved that the accused
promptly notified the proper representative of the state council of
defense of his inability to obtain employment, and requested that
work or employment be found for him, and that such employment
Hudgins, the petitioner, had enlisted
was not furnished him.'
in the army, had seen extensive service in France, and had been
discharged in May, 1919. After his return to this state and nearly
a year and a half after the cessation of hostilities, and after the
state council of defense had disbanded, he was indicted for failure
to work during two weeks in April, 1920, was convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment for thirty days. Upon petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, he sought his discharge from custody on
two grounds: first, that the statute had by its terms expired before
the alleged violations occurred; and second, that in any event, the
statute was unconstitutional. The court refused to pass on the
first contention, but ordered the petitioner's discharge from custody on the broad ground that the statute was unconstitutional,
being in arbitrary and unreasonable restraint of personal liberty.
This decision is open to criticism on at least three counts.3
In the first place, by refusing to pass upon the contention that
'

Professor of Law, West Virginia University.

1 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S. E. 327, 9 A. L. R. 1361 (1920).

2W.Va. Acts 1917 (2d Ex. Sess.) c. 12, §2. Although the statute was
framed in terms of vagrancy, no importance attaches to that fact. Since it
applied to everyone without regard to whether he had other means of support,
we shall here deal with it, as the court did, as a statute aimed at raising war
production by compelling everyone to work.
3 For a contemporary criticism, see Editorial Note (1921) 27 W. VA. L. Q.
171.
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the statute had expired, the court violated an elementary principle
of constitutional law -namely, that a court will not decide a constitutional question unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case, and hence, as it was put by Mr. Justice Brandeis, "if a case
can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or
general law, the Court will decide only the latter."4 This principle
is a fundamental one, deep-rooted in our constitutional system. It
is based upon the notion that the doctrine of separation of powers
requires the judiciary to exercise with greatest caution its power
to declare statutes unconstitutional, and thus nullify the action
of a coordinate branch of government. Anything less than this is
itself an unconstitutional encroachment by the judiciary on the
province of the legislature. That our court is fully aware of this,
is evidenced by the following statement:
"The decision of a question involving the constitutionality
of an act is one of the gravest and most delicate of the judicial
functions, and while the court will meet the question with
firmness where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of
wisdom, and a just respect for the legislature renders it proper,
to waive it if the case in which it arises can be decided on
other points. " 5
Clear as this may be, instead of holding in the THudgins case,
as was obviously the intent of the legislature, that the war ended
with the armistice, and hence that the statute expired six months
thereafter, long before the alleged violations for which the accused
was convicted, the court went out of its way to declare the statute
void. In summarily disposing of the petitioner's first contention,
the court said: "Whether the war had then ended within the provisions of this act, we need not decide, for we have reached the
conclusion that the act is unconstitutional and ought to be so declared."'
This, despite the fact that the court recognized that
the primary purpose of the legislature was to bring the productive
resources of the state "up to the highest standard for war purposes." '7 This purpose was to be accomplished by seeing to it that
during the war no able bodied man within the state failed to do his
share. Certain it is that the legislature never intended to penalize
one like the petitioner who had done his full share in the military
4 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347, 56 S. Ct.
466, 80 L. Ed. 688 (1936).
Norris v. County Court, 111 W. Va. 692, 693, 163 S. E. 418 (1932).
BEz parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 529, 103 S. E. 327 (1920).
7 Id. at 530.
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service, and a fortiori that it never intended to punish him or anyone else for a failure to work nearly a year and a half after the
war was over. Since this ground for discharging the petitioner is
so clear, it is all the more surprising that the court insisted upon
declaring the whole statute unconstitutional.
The second score on which the case should be criticized is
found in the court's implication that even if the statute were otherwise unobjectionable, it would still be unconstitutional because of
a lack of power in the state to pass such war legislation. After
pointing out the limited scope of the state's war power, as expressly provided for in our Constitution, the court said: "While greater
production during the period of the war might be desirable, is
that a subject with which the state had the right to deal? We
think not." 8 Though not stated in so many words, the idea seems
to be that under the broad grant of war powers to the federal government, the subject matter of the statute lies in a field reserved
exclusively for federal action, and hence, even in the absence of
congressional action, the states have no power to deal with the
matter.
That this proposition is unsound seems clear from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gilbert v. Minnesota.9 It was there held, by the court which has the last say on
qaestions involving conflicts of power between the states and the
federal government, that even in a field where congress had exercised its war powers, the states had a reserved power to cooperate
uith the federal government, and consequently that state legislation would be upheld if it was in furtherance of, and not in conflict with, congressional action. As it was put by the court,
". .. The United States is composed of the States, the
States are constituted of the citizens of the United States, who
also are citizens of the States, and it is from these citizens
that armies are raised and wars waged, and whether to victory and its benefits, or to defeat and its calamities, the States
as well as the United States are intimately concerned ...
Cold and technical reasoning in its minute consideration may
indeed insist on a separation of the sovereignties and resistance
in each to any cooperation from the other, but there is opposing
demonstration in the fact that this country is one composed of
many and must on occasions be animated as one and that the
constituted and constituting sovereignties must have power
of cooperation against the enemies of all.'" 10
8Id. at 530.
9254 U. S. 325, 41 S. Ct. 125, 65 L. Ed. 287 (1920).
10 1d. at 329.
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The third and most severe criticism of the case is directed to
the court's holding that the state may not constitutionally require
its citizens to work during a period of national peril, when the continued existence of the national government and of the state itself
may well depend on the mass production of war materials. Although neither the petitioner nor the court referred to the due
process clauses of the state and federal constitutions, it seems clear
that the claim of unconstitutionality boils down to the same question which would be raised under the due process clause." The
holding that the statute was not a proper exercise of the police
power was in essence a holding that the statute constituted an
arbitrary and unreasonable restraint on personal liberty, and therefore a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
In the light of fundamental principles of constitutional law,
such a holding is indefensible. Everyone recognizes that the
guarantee of liberty in state and federal constitutions is not absolute, but is merely a protection against palpably unreasonable and
arbitrary governmental interference. In order to meet the test
of constitutionality on this score, a restraint on liberty need not
affirmatively appear to be reasonable. So strong is the presumption
of constitutionality, it is only necessary that the restraint not be
clearly unreasonable under the circumstances. If the question of
reasonableness is fairly debatable, a court may not properly declare the statute unconstitutional. To do so is again an unconstitutional encroachment by the court on the domain of the legislature. That this is true has long been recognized by our court.
For example, in State v. Peel Splint Coal Co.,12 involving liberty
of contract, it was said that judicial power to declare legislative
action void,
".. . must from the very nature of the case be limited
and definitely restricted to such statutes as appear on their
face, or from facts judicially known, so capricious, so unreasonable, as to be clearly and plainly in violation of the constitutional guaranties. 'Every possible presumption is in
favor of the validity of the statute, and this continues until
1' "The broad ground taken by petitioner and his counsel is that the statute
sought to be enforced against him is an unjust and unreasonable restraint upon
his personal liberty, guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions. What
is personal liberty under the law? As definied by Blackstone, it 'consists in
the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or
restraint, unless by due course of law.' " Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526,
529, 103 S. E. 327 (1920).
12 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000, 17 L. R. A. 385 (1892).
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the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt. One branch
of the government can not encroach on the domain of another
without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no
small degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule.' "1s
Certain it is, that the court lost sight of these principles in
holding the statute in question unconstitutional. Note that implicit
in the court's reasoning is the proposition that congress would also
be prohibited from passing such a statute, because the liberty of the
individual is by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment afforded the same degree of protection against arbitrary action by
congress. Yet no person could reasonably argue that congress,
which has the unquestioned authority to require military service,
involving not only a restraint on liberty but often a loss of life
itself, may not with equal propriety require civilian service on the
production line. And if congress may do so, then the states, in an
effort to cooperate with the national government, may do likewise
so long as the state regulations are in furtherance of, and not in
conflict with, the action taken by congress.
Mluch might even be said for the reasonableness of a requirement in peace time that all be engaged in productive activity. The
reasonableness of such a requirement in time of war is clear. And
when it is remembered that the reasonableness of a regulation need
not affirmatively appear, it is almost unbelievable that our court
could ever have held that the statute in question was wholly unreasonable and arbitrary. Twelve other states passed similar
statutes,14 and in Delaware, the only other state in which the
question was presented to the supreme court for decision, the constitutionality of the statute was upheld. 15
It is to be hoped that, in its consideration of future war emergency legislation, our court will not only recognize that in the
prosecution of the war there is a broad field for the exercise of
state power in cooperation with the federal government, but will
also employ more judicial self-restraint in passing upon the validity
of legislative action than was apparent in the Hudgins case.
CLxDE L. CoLsoN.
13 Id. at 837-838.
14 For collection of statutes, see Hoague, Brown and Marcus, Wartime Conscription and Control of Labor (1940) 54 H nv. L. REv. 50, 59-61, particularly

n. 49.
15

State v. McClure, 30 Del. 265, 105 Atl. 712 (1919).
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